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IN THE SUPRE~lli COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE 
CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES 
N. TUCKER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16147, 16040, 
and 16019 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants Sharp and Christensen were charged by 
complaint and information with theft of a motor vehicle, a 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
and with aiding the escape of a person from official custody, 
a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-310 (1953) as amended. 
Appellant Tucker was also charged with theft of a 
motor vehicle and with the crime of escape from official 
custody, a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-309 (1953), 
as amended. 
Appellants Sharp and Christensen appeal both of 
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their convictions. Appellant Tucker appeals his conviction 
for theft but does not challenge his conviction of escape 
from official custody. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following a trial by jury before the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft on August 3 and 4, 1978, appellants were 
found guilty as charged. Each appellant was given two 
concurrent sentences of one to fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison to be served following completion of the 
sentences they were currently serving. 
~E~=EF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the convictions 
and sentences o= a~?ellants. 
S'::-_ZI.TE~IENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 18, 1978, appellant Tucker was a prisoner 
in the rininum sec~rity compound of the Utah State Prison. 
He was serving an indeterminate sentence of one to fifteen 
years for the crime of rape (R. at 189, State's Exhibit 2-5) 
and had not been paroled or pardoned (R. at 191, State's 
Exhibit 3-5). Appellants Sharp and Christensen were also 
confined in minimus security at the Prison following felony 
convictio!ls and 90-day presentence evaluation commitments 
(E. at 193, State's E}:hibits Ss and 6s ). Zl,ll three '-''ere 
clothed i!l denim trousers when they were given shovels and 
-2-
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left with another inmate named Brooks along a ditch on 
Prison property to carry out a work detail at about 1:00 
p.m. Appellant Tucker had on a blue shirt and headband. 
Appellant Sharp had an orange shirt stuck in his pocket 
and appellant Christensen had on an orange shirt (R. at 
206-209). 
At about 3:00 p.m., Prison Instructor Paul 
Christensen, who was supervising the work detail, noticed 
inmate Brooks walking alone toward the minimum security 
area of the Prison (R. at 211). Upon investigation, the 
shovels which had been issued to appellants were discovered, 
one lying at the end of the ditch, the other two where the 
men had begun working (R. at 211) . After an unsuccessful 
a~tempt to locate appellants, Mr. Christensen notified Prison 
Control that an escape had occurred (R. at 213). A head 
ccc.:nt was immediately conducted and it was discovered that 
c?ccellants viere, indeed, missing (R. at 224, 225). 
At about the same time, 3:00p.m. on April 18, 1978, 
t~o female employees of Riverton City were sitting in the 
city offices and noticed three men walking together (R. at 230). 
The men wore blue shirts and denim pants. One wor~ a headband. 
(?. at 231-232). Riverton Police Chief, Leonard Smock, 
also saw the men and noted that cne of them wore a turquoise 
blue shirt. 
"'·at 285). 
He identified another as appellant Christensen 
-3-
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s:::..:::::s. 
'?. 
'-- :::._ , c:1e 
at 29~!- ~er_:n:..ty She~iff c·urtis :~ielson 
tsstifis~ ~hat ~;hile he ~as searching ~~e D8~ntainsi~e ~e 
apprehs~ded appellant Sharp hidi~g under a t~ee. 
turqucis~ shirt was found with hin (R. at 305-307). 
Gfficer ~~ipple noted tha~ he took appellant C~riste~sen 
into custody as Christensen was trying to hide in the 
-4-
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brush (R. at 313). 
Larry Debillo had been driving in the area with 
his wife and had stopped at a roadblock conducted by prison 
officers. They gave him a flyer with a picture and descrip-
tion of appellant Tucker (R. at 255). As Mr. Debillo was 
driving toward Lark, Utah he saw appellant Tucker hitchhiking 
and picked him up (R. at 257-258). Mr. Debillo was armed 
(R. at 256). After driving for a while, Mr. Debillo took 
appellant Tucker into custody and sent his wife for the 
sheriff (R. at 259-261). 
Appellant Tucker testified for the defense and 
indicated that he had left the Prison work detail (R. at 340) 
and had met appellants Christensen and Sharp in Riverton. 
He said he had been drinking (R. at 344). He claimed that 
later as he and appellant Sharp were walking along the road, 
appellant Christensen drove up in the white Cadillac. Tucker 
testified that he and Sharp joined Christensen in the car 
and together they headed toward the Prison. However, they 
then decided to go for a ride. When the police began the 
chase Tucker did not ask the others to stop the car because 
he did not want the police to catch him (R. at 346 and 347). 
After deliberation,. the jury found appellant Tucker 
9uilty of 7heft and Escape from official custody and appellants 
Sharp and Christensen guilty of Theft and Aiding Escape {R. 
at l2:C to 126). 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS SHARP AND CHRISTENSEN lVERE 
PROPERLY CONVICTED OF AIDING THE ESCAPE 
OF APPELLANT TUCKER. 
A 
THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANTS 
\VAS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE 
ESCAPE/AIDING ESCAPE STATUTES. 
Appellants Sharp and Christensen contend that their 
conduct was not sufficient to constitute a violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-8-310 (1953), as amended, which provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of ~n offense if: 
a) ~~ ~~ds another person to escape 
from official custody:. 
(2) An offense under this section is a 
felony of the second degree if~ 
b) ·"' person to \>'hom the aid . . is 
given is a prisoner confined in 
the state prison. 
Escape from Official Custody is proscribed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-309 (1953), as amended, which provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he 
escapes from official custody. 
(2) The offense is a felony of the second 
degree if: . 
b) The actor escapes from confinement 
in the state prison. 
Appellants urge a very narrow reading of these 
statutes which Respondent submits is improper. By urging 
that an escape is complete as soon as an actor sets foot 
off prison property and th2t any aid given thereafter cannot 
-6-
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be aiding an escape, appellants argue that there was no 
proof of the necessary acts or intent to constitute the 
crime charged. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the 
cases cited by appellants reveals that appellants' inter-
pretation of the Utah statutes is unduly restrictive and 
that conviction in this matter is consistent with the law 
of aiding escape throughout the country. 
In Orth v. United States, 252 F. 566 (5th Cir. 
1918), the defendant had been convicted on two counts. 
Each count involved a seperate portion of a federal statute. 
The first count charged that the defendant had aided an 
escaped prisoner. The facts indicated that the defendant 
had allowed an escapee to hide in his home and then sent 
him on his way. The escapee had been free for some days 
be~ore the defendant rendered any aid. The Court ruled 
that conviction for aiding the escape was improper but 
noted: 
This conclusion does not effect 
(sic) the conviction on the second 
count charging that the defendant 
harbored and concealed. (Id. at 568) 
7he de~endant's sentence was affirmed. 
Unlike the United States Code as applied in Orth, 
the Utah Code does not contain a statute proscribing 
t~e act o~ harborin~ cr aidinc an escaped prisoner. Moreover, 
of conduct undertaken by all appellants in this 
-;-
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matter indicates an on-going act. Within the space of a 
few hours appellants walked away fro~ the prison, took a 
car and attempted to elude the police. There was ample 
evidence from which the jury could and did infer an on-
going attempt to elude authorities and complete an escape 
to freedom. Given the locale of the prison, it is clear 
that no escapee can get far without some transportation. 
Unlike Orth, where the escapee had been at large for 
several days before the de~endant gave aid, appellants 
Sharp and Christensen left the prison at or near the same 
time as appellant Tucker and all three were actively 
corroboratl~G in a at~emc~ to avoid police a very short 
time therec:~ter. h';'1ile the narrow reading of "escape" was 
appro:;nia te in Orth h'here the conduct of the defendant 
remained criminal under another more applicable portion of 
the same statute, in Utah there is no soeci!ic alternate 
The lack of such a orovision indicates that the 
escape and aiding escape statutes should be read broadly 
enough to include help rendered during the entire attempt 
by ~he escapee to place himself beyond the reach of legal 
Appellants Sharp and Christensen h'ere helping 
Appellant Tucker avoid re-capture h'ithin an hour of h'hen 
they ~ere all discovered ~~ssina fro~ the same ~ork detail 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at the prison. It would be unduly restrictive to rule 
that aid given so soon after a departure from the prison 
as part of such a clearly continuous course of events was 
not aiding the escape of appellant Tucker. 
Other authority cited by appellants supports a 
more broad reading of the Utah statutes. In State v. Jones,· 
36 P.2d 530 (Idaho 1934), a prisoner was working outside 
the jail under the supervision of a deputy. Although he 
was supposed to be delivering coal, he went, instead, to the 
house of a friend with whom he had left some money he had 
stolen. His friend, the defendant, gave him some money 
and sent him on his way. Although the court cited People v. 
Quijada, 53 Cal.App 39, 199 P. 854 (1921) to state the narrow 
defi~ition of escape, the court held that the escapee was 
in t~e lawful custody of the deputy when he was assisted 
by the defendant (36 P.2d at 531), even though he had clearly 
gone where he was not authorized to go. The defendant's 
conviction for aiding escape was affirmed. Just as in Jones, 
the actions of appellants Sharp and Christensen in this matter 
were rendered contemporaneously with Appellant Tucker's 
escape anc made it possible for appellant Tucker 
::o place himself comfortably beyond the ir.unediate reach of 
authority. 
State ex rel. Farrior v. Faulk, 136 So. 601 (Fla., 
-9-
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1931), cited by appellants, did not involve an aiding escape 
chargco. The escapee had left the jail and had gone into a 
neighboring county. The sheriff of that county arrested 
him and sought expenses and transportation costs from the 
original county. The court held that the escapee was an 
escaped prisoner and that the sheriff was able to arrest and 
was entitled to costs. The ruling was clearly made in the 
interests of orderly and efficient police work. There was 
absolutely no indication of how the court might have ruled 
upon the question of when help given to an escapee may 
properly be ter~ed as aiding the escape. 
In People v. Quintero, 67 Mich. App. 481, 241 N.W. 
2d 251 (1976), ~~e question of aiding escape was, again, not 
an issue. It was not clear in that case whether the escapee-
defendant had been found off or on the prison ground. The 
court said that he "escapes if he removes himself from the 
imposed restraint over his person and volition." (Id. at 252). 
The evidence in the instant matter indicates that appellants 
1·1ere all trying to do just that-remove themselves from 
restraint over their persons and volition. They were disco1·ecc 
missing at about 3:00 p.m. and were seen driving away in a 
car not their own within the half hour. If they were ever 
separated, it was for a VEry short time. _c, perfectly acceptat~ 
logical inference for the jury to have made was that all 
-l 0-
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appellants left the prison together. In any event, in 
light of the absence of a harboring statute in Utah the 
narrow view that one may aid an escape only by acting 
before or as the escapee leaves the narrowest physical 
confines of his confinement would be unjust. In this 
case appellants acted in concert during or very shortly 
after their departure from prison property to make good 
their getaway. The time interval was so short as to make 
consecutive events of walking away, stealing the car, 
and eluding police one continuous transaction. 
B 
THE NECESSARY INTENT ELEMENT 
WAS SHOI\'N BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellants contend that the necessary intent element 
was not shown and that their conviction was therefore defec-
~ive. Appellants correctly note that where a specific inteQt 
is not provided for a crime, a culpable mental state is 
required, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1953), as amended. 
However, it is well established that criminal intent may 
be in:erred and need not be shown by direct evidence. See 
State v. }linousis, 64 utah 206 at 211-212, 228 P. 574 (1924) 
and State v. Kazda, 15 U.2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 at 488 (1964). 
Appellants contend -that the intent element for 
aidins escape must be the same as for escape under Utah Code 
_:..r.r:. § 76-2-202 (1953), as amended. Even if they are correct, 
-11-
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it Joes not follow from the evidence that the jury could 
not have concluded that appellants Sharp and Christensen 
did not intend to effectuate an escape when they acted as 
they did. In Luke v. State, 49 Ala. 30 (1873) the defendants 
were charged with arson for burning a hole in the jail 
floor. The elements of arson required that the fire be 
set for an illegal purpose. The court found such purpose 
in that the defendants were aiding each other to escape. 
All three appellants here were confined in the Utah State 
Prison. They all did their best, both together and then, 
later, apart, to evade re-capture. Their tactic of running 
in different di~ections after abandoning the car increased 
the chances that one or more might get away from which t~e 
jury could infer an intent to aid each other in their 
common act. As in Luke, appellants acted in concert to 
achieve an escape. 
In State v. Navarro, 163 A. 103 (Maine, 1932), the 
court noted that "aiding an escape is any overt act '-'>'hich is 
intended to assist an attempted or completed departure of 
a prisoner from lawful custody before he is discharged by 
due process of law." (Id. at 104). The defendant had given 
aid after hearing of the prisoner's de;:'c:rture. E\-en if, for 
the sake of argument, it is conceded that appellant Tucker's 
testimony was correct, (thc:t he net appellants Christensen 
-12-
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and Sharp after leaving the Prison) , they clearly aided him 
in his further attempt to evade authority. All three acted 
together in evading re-capture. The intent to assist each 
other, as noted above, is clearly inferrable from their 
actions. 
Finally, State v. Cooper, 113 N.J.Super 34, 272 
A.2d 557 (1971), supports this conclusion. In that case 
the defendant started a jail riot during which two prisoners 
escaped. He was found guilty of aiding their escape. The 
court stated that it was not necessary to show actual par-
ticipation in the escape or any intent to aid the escape. 
The court said the defendant should have known that his 
acts could create a possibility for escape and affirmed 
the conviction. The facts here are much stronger. The acts 
of appellants Sharp and Christensen clearly went to aiding 
ap8ellant Tucker to make his esca8e complete. They knew 
Tucker ~as, like themselves, inca~cerated in the prison and 
it ~as clearly inferrable that they knew and intended that 
their actions would create a possibility for Tucker's escape. 
Appellants contend further that there was no 
evidence of a specific intent to aid appellant Tuc~er's 
escape. They say that they, appellants Sharp and Christensen, 
~e~e simply engaging in a Class B ~isdemeanor escape when 
-13-
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appellant Tucker happened along. By so arguing, they 
concede that escape is an on-going crime since, according 
to appellant Tucker's testimony, he met his co-defendants 
outside the prison. But even more important is the fact 
that from the moment the evidence puts the three together 
in Riverton there was clearly a common intent and effort 
to avoid re-capture. They were hardly "clean away" when 
they were on foot in Riverton in prison clothing. They 
were in a car, ru~ning away from the police within less than 
an hour of when they were reported missing at the prison. 
They were all co~~l~~~ng the same physical acts--the only 
difference between the Class B Misdemeanor of appellants 
Sharp and Ch~is~e~se~ and the second degree felony of 
appellant Tucker was the technical status of the men at 
the prison. Clearly the jury could have inferred an intent 
to co~mit the crime of aiding the escape of appellant Tucker 
on beha~f of appellants Sharp a~d Christensen. This concl'-.Jsio:. 
is supported by the holding of the court in State v. Stark, 
490 P.2 511 (Or.App., 1971) cited by appellants at p.ll. 
In that case the defendant and several of his friends had 
picked up two hitchhikers. The hitchhikers were robbed and 
defendant contended ''that to find him guilty of the unarmed 
robbery the jury should have been instructed that he (Stark) 
had to knowingly aid and abE:'':: Ronald Hansen." The court 
-l~-
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held that the following instruction was proper: 
It is sufficient if the defendant 
William Gerald Stark . . . was or~sent 
when the robbery was committed,-and 
acquiesced therein, with a common 
criminal intent or purpose. 
All three appellants were escaping from authority. 
They were doing it together and were acting in such a way 
as to aid each other. This was clearly shown by the evidence 
and the verdicts were proper. 
c 
THE RULE OF STATE V. SHONDEL 
IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
Appellants contend that under the case of State 
v. Shondel, 22 U.2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) and this Court's 
~ore recent affirmations of the rule of that case, they were 
in?rO?erly charged and sentenced. Respondent respectfully 
submits that appellants have misread Shondel. In Shondel 
and the cases which followed, State v. Fair,23 U.2d 34, 456 
P.2d 168 (1969); Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977); 
and State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978), the concern 
was always with two statutes creating the same crime but 
s~eci=ying separate penalties. In Shondel, possession of 
LSD was prohibited in two statutes. One statute made the 
crime a misdemeanor and another made it a felony. Similar 
problems were posed in the subsequent cases cited above. 
-15-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A fundamental difference between those cases and the matter 
at hand is that the defendants in those cases could not 
have been charged with or convicted of violating both statutes. 
The court had to make a choice as to which statute to proceed 
under. In this case the supposedly conflicting statutes 
proscribe escape and aiding escape. In aiding appellant 
Tucker's escape, appellants Sharp and Christensen committed 
a second degree felony. In effectuating their own escape, 
appellants Sharp and Christensen committed a Class B Misdemeanor. 
It is well-established that within one episode or continuous 
course of conduct an actor may commit more than one crime, 
Utah Code Ann. § ~~-l-402 (1953), as amended. Moreover, it 
has been made clear by this Court that when two crimes are 
committed, neither of which may be tried within the same 
court, that they may be tried separately. See State v. 
Cooley, 575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978) where the defendant had 
committed three offenses within the same course of conduct. 
Two of the offenses were Class B misdemeanors and one was 
an indictable misdemeanor. The Court held that separate 
prosecutions in the District Court and the Justice Court 
were proper. Conviction of aiding the escape of appellant 
Tucker did not preclude the state from further prosecution 
of appellant's Sharp and Christensen for the crime of escape. 
They could have properly been charged and convicted of both 
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crimes. The fact that one act creates two separate criminal 
results does not prohibit the prosecution of both crimes. 
Under Shondel when achievement of the same criminal result 
may result in differing penalties, the lesser penalty must 
be imposed. No such choice is mandated in this case. 
Appellants were, therefore, properly charged and convicted. 
Their verdicts and sentences should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS WERE PROPERLY CONVICTED 
OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE 
AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF TEMPORARILY DEPRIVING AN 
Ol'INER OF A VEHICLE. 
Appellants concede the establishment of all the 
elements of the crime of theft of an operable motor vehicle 
except for intent to permanently deprive (Appellants' Brief 
a~ p. 18). They contend that the evidence was ambiguous 
on that element and that the trial court committed error 
in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense 
of joyriding, as they requested. Respondent submits that 
the evidence clearly indicated that the offense of appellants 
was not joyriding and that they were guilty of the_ offense 
of which they were convicted. 
Utall Code Annotated § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
provides: 
A person commits theft if he 
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obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
utah Code Annotated § 76-6-401 (3) (1953), as amended provides 
further: 
Purpose to deprive means to have 
the conscious object: To withhold pro-
perty permanently or for so extended 
a period or to use under such circum-
stances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and 
benefit thereof, would be lost; 
In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 at 218 (Utah 1976) this 
Court held that: 
The intent to steal or unlawfully 
deprive •te rig~tful owners of their 
proper~: c~~ be inferred by defendant's 
conduct and the attendant circumstances 
testi~~ed to by the ~itnesses. 
In State v. Gil:ci_an, 23 U.2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 at 812 (1970) 
this Court quoted State v. Johnson, 112 Ll. 130, 185 P. 2d 
738 (1947) to say: 
That the defendant is entitled to have 
the jury instructed on his theorv cf the 
case if there is anv substantial evidence 
to justify givi:~g s~ch an i:1struction. 
(Emphasis in original). 
In State v. Doughert~ 550 P.2d 175 at 176-177 (Utah 1976) 
this Court further noted that an instruction on a lesser 
included offense may be refused ''if the prosecution has met 
its burden of proof 0:1 the greater offense, and there is no 
evider:ce tending to reduce the greater oC::"e:1se." 
-18-
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The evidence in this matter clearly demonstrated 
that appellants intent was to permanently deprive the owner 
of her automobile. Apoellants contend that because there 
was no significant damage done to the vehicle and that the 
vehicle was recovered only a short distance from the point 
of taking within a relatively short time tha~ the court 
must necessarily have concluded that appellants only intended 
to make temporary use of the vehicle. While the facts noted 
by appellants are in the record, they do not present a 
complete picture of what transpired and should not be viewed 
out of context. The only reason the car was recovered 
quickly with minimal damage was because police reacted almost 
imrnediately to the theft. The automobile was abandoned after 
a high-speed chase (R. at 294). The fact of temporary 
possession does not and should not be taken to indicate an 
intent to possess temporarily. On the contrary, the fact 
that appellants were escaped prisoners trying to elude re-
capture indicated clearly that they had no intention of 
returning the car to its owner after a short drive in the 
neighborhood. Appellant Tucker's testimony that they were 
only trying to return to prison with the car is totally 
inconsistant with all the other evidence. If they were 
returning to custody, why did they flee from the police both 
in the car and then, later, on foot? Moreover, even if 
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Tucker's testimony were believable, there was no indication 
that appellants would have done anything to see that the 
owner of the automobile would have recovered the vehicle 
within a short period of time, if ever. 
Several cases from other jurisdictions are instructi~ 
on this point. In People v. Hutchins, 20 Cal Rptr. 497 
(Cal. App., 1962) the defendant was charged with grand theft 
of an automobile. He had ~ented a car from a Hertz outlet 
in Long Beach but had not returned the car on the agreed date. 
The car was, in fact, left abandoned on or near another 
Hertz lot at tte ~os kngeles airport. The court held that 
the evidence was sufficient tc prove that the defendant took 
t~e ca~ ~it~ t~e i~tent to de?rive the cwner of title to a~d 
possession of tte vehicle. 
In Robinso:c v. Commom:ealth, 190 \'a. 134, 56 S.E.22. 
367 (19~9) the de:':endant and others broke into a car cealershi: 
a~~ took a ne~ Fo=d automobile. The car was found several 
The defendant was convicted cf theft and contende~ 
en appeal that he was guilty of unauthorized use, not theft. 
The court held: 
In the case at bar the conduct 
of the defendant negatives any idea 
that he intended to deprive the owner 
of the car tempora~ily. Ee did no act 
prio~ to ~is arrest tc ~ndicate t~at 
he inte~~e6 to ~eturn the car to the 
o~ner. On the o~her ~and, his con6uct 
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and testimony disclose that he intended 
to deprive the owner of the car perma-
nently. This is the only conclusion 
that can be reached from the evidence. 
The circumstances under which the car 
was taken, and his actions regarding 
it afterwards, including his abandoning 
it in a public highway, show clearly 
that he was guilty of the offense of 
larceny and not of unauthorized use. 
We do not think that the instruction 
offered was proper, and the court did 
not commit error in refusing it. 
Id. at 372. 
So also the facts in this case would not have 
justified an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
joyriding. Appellants did nothing to indicate that they 
~ad any intent other than to permanently deprive the owner 
CJf possession. They ran away fro~ the police. They abandoned 
the auto~obile. They drove the car in a dangerously reckless 
~a.:1ner. (R. at 290,294, 308,312). They were escaped priso~ers. 
~poellants should ~ot be~efit fro~ the quick and efficient 
ac-tion of the Ri\:erton Police in that an offense othenvise 
a felony is reduced to a rrisdemeanor because they were quickly 
apprehended. 
Appellant relies upon State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 
(Ctah 1977). Eowever, that case is disti~guishabl~ in that 
:~ere the Court held that the jur~ was properly instructed 
~n both the greater and lesser offenses because the evidence 
intent was clearly in coubt. The defendant had oresented 
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evidence which tended to negate an intent to permantly 
deprive. In this case the only possible evidence of such 
a nature was the un-supported, incredible assertions of 
appellant Tucker that the car had been taken to return to 
prison. Even that testimony does not indicate any intent to 
return the automobile to the owner, at best, it simply indica tee 
that the appellants may not have intended to travel a long 
distance. The car was recovered and returned quickly but not 
through the actions of ap?ellants. 
In summary, an instruction on the lesser-included 
offense of joyriding was not justified in this case since no 
reasonable Vl2w of the eviaence would have supported a convict:: 
of such an offense. Moreover, the intent of appellants to 
permantly decrive the owner of the stolen automobile was 
clearlv and properly inferrable from tte evidence. The 
convictions were proper and should be affirmed. 
POHT III 
SINCE EACH APPELLANT RECEIVED TWO 
EQUAL CONCURRECIT SEl'ITEl\CES, AN Hi-
PROPER CONVICTION ON ONE SENTENCE 
IS HARMLESS ERROR. 
Utah Code Ann. §'76-3-401(7) (1953) as amended provides 
that whenever two equel, concurrent sentences are imposed, 
"they shall merge into one sentence." In the instant ~atter, 
all appellants received t~o equal, concurrent sentences. The 
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practical effect is that each appellant has received one 
sentence on two alternate theories of conviction. 
Appellant Tucker does not challenge his conviction 
of escape in this appeal. Hence, even if the Court finds 
that the conviction for theft of an automobile was defective, 
appellant Tucker's sentence should stand unchanged. 
Appellants Sharp and Christensen were convicted of 
both aiding the escape of Tucker and of theft of an automobile. 
In order for their sentences to be altered, this Court must 
find that both of their convictions were defective. If the 
court finds that only one conviction is defective, their 
sentences should also remain unchanged. This is the same 
circu~stance which faced the court in Orth v. United States, 
supra, wherein the defendant had been convicted upon two 
counts, one of which was held improper. The defendant's 
sentence was left unaltered since conviction on the proper 
count alone produced the penalty. 
To capsulize, a finding by this Court that the 
theft convictions were improper, by itself, would indicate 
harmless error since the convictions of escape and aiding 
escape would remain unchanged and the sentences of appellants 
would remain the same. Moreover, a finding that the aiding 
escape convictions alone were de~ective would produce the 
same result. Unless this Court £inds for appellants on all 
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issues raised in this appeal, a~y error noted is harnless 
error since the sentences ~f a;pellants ~o~ld not be altered. 
In any event, any finding of t~is Court on the issues raised 
on betalf of appellant Tucker can have no bearing upon his 
conviction and sentence since he does not challenge his 
conviction of escape. Any error with respect to appellant 
Tucker is, therefore, har~less. 
CC:~CLCSIC~\ 
Appellants Sharp and Christensen ~ere properly 
charged ~ith and convicted of aiding the escape of appellant 
indica~es ~~a~ ~~e actio~s of ~~pella~ts Starp a~d C~=is~e~se~ 
a:-1C. c::-.~istense!1 also cCD.Y.ti.. ~ted L~e c::::.- i~e c: escape does :-:ct 
~otor ~ehicle and ~ot joyridi~~. ~o reasonable view of the 
evidence ~ould have supported a conviction of joyriding and 
the co~rt pro?erl~- re~use~ a~ ::-:str~c~io:-: o~ t~e lesser =~~~e. 
-2~-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on so~e but not all of the issues raised in this appeal, 
the error must be considered harmless since the convictions 
and sentences of appellants Sharp and Christensen remain 
essentially unchanged unless they prevail on all issues 
raised. In any event, appellant Tucker has not challenged 
his escape conviction and a finding that his conviction for 
automobile theft ~as defective would not alter his sentence 
and should be regarded as harmless. 
The convictions and sentences of appellants should 
be sustained as proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBER? o. R~~SE~ 
Attor~ey General 
EA~L ?. DORICS 
Assis~ant Attorney General 
Attor~eys for Respondent 
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